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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM
JUNIOR CONLEY, Defendant and Appellant.
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Homicide-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions. - In a
homicide case, the refusal to instruct on manslaughter was
prejudicial error where defendant's diminished mental capacity and his intoxication were both suggested as theories on
which manslaughter instructions were required.
[2] Criminal Law-Evidence-Mental State.-Evidence of defendant's diminished mental capacity, whether caused by intoxication, trauma, or disease, can be used to show that he did not
have the specific mental state essential to an offense.
[3] Homicide-Manslaughter-Statutory Provisions.-Since Pen.
Code, § 192, was enacted before the concept of diminished
capacity was developed, the enumeration of nonlllalicious criminal homicides in the statutory provisions for manslaughter
could not be exclusive: in the absence of malice, a homicide
cannot be an offense higher than manslaughter.
[4] Id.-Manslaughter-Voluntary Manslaughter.-A finding of
provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter is not

[2) See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 154; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st
ed § 348).
[4) See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 125; Am.Jur., Homicide (1st
cd § 19).
McK. Dig. References: [1,9] Homicide, § 270; [2] Criminal Law,
~ 403; [3] Homicide, § 19: [4] Homicide, § 22; [5, 7] Homicide,
§ 197; [6, 21] Homicide, § 10; [8] Homicide, §§ 157, 159 (1); [10]
Homicide, § 239; [11, 14-16, 18-20] Homicide, § 13; [12] Homicide,
~179(3); [13] Homicide, §§13, 21; [17] Homicidc, §15(2);
[22] Criminal Law, §§ 25, 37; Homicide, § 10; [23] Criminal Law,
§§ 25, 37; [24] HOlllicide, § 21; [25] Criminal Law, § 777; [26, 27]
Criminal Law, § 551(4); [28] Homicide, § 118.
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the sole means of negating malice and establishing voluntary
manslaughter. Unless justified or excused, an intentional killing by one incapable of harboring malice aforethought because
of a mental disease, defect, Or intoxication is voluntary
manslaughter.
[6] Id.-Instructions-Defenses-Mental State.-Defend'ant's plea
of "not guilty" to a first degree murder charge put in issue the
existence of the mental states that are elements of that offense,
namely, intent, deliberation, wilfulness, premeditation, and
malice aforethought. Introduction of any evidence deserving
of consideration that defendant lacked anyone of these mental
states entitled him to an instruction on the effect of this lack.
[6] ld.-Mental State.-The defense of mental illness not amounting to legal insanity is a significant issue in any homicide case
in which it is raised by substantial evidence. Its purpose and
effect are to ameliorate the law governing criminal responsibility prescribed by the M'Naughton rule.
[7] ld. - Instructions - Defenses - Mental State. - Under the
Wells-Gorsken rule of diminished responsibility, a defendant
legally sane according to the M'Naughton test but suffering
from a mental illness that prevented his acting with mali, '!
aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation cannot be
convicted of first degree murder. Where there is evidence to
inform the court that defendant is relying on the d~fense of
diminished mental responsibility, the court, on its own motion,
must instruct the jury on the legal significance of such evidence.
[8] ld.-Evidence-Mental State: Defenses.-Implicit in defendant's defense to a murder charge on the theory of unconsciousness, supported by evidence of his intoxication, mental illness,
and his testimony that he did not recollect the shooting and
did not intend to kill, was the defense of diminished mental
capacity. The jury could reject the claim of complete unconsciousness and yet believe that the evidence introduced to
establish unconsciousness was sufficient to indicate a substan,tial reduction of defendant's mental capacity.
[9] ld.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-Where the jury
was not advised that diminished mental capacity could negate
the existence of malice and that defendant's homicides could
not be murder absent malice, despite evidence of defendant's
diminished mental capacity when he shot and killed two persons, the withholding of this material issue from the jury was
in itself a miscarriage of justice and required reversal.
[10] ld.-Verdict.-A jury verdict of first degree murder with a
finding that defendant's act was intentional, voluntary, delib, erate and premeditated was not necessarily a finding that defendant acted with malice aforethought where that issue was
Dot presented to the jury.
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[11] Id.-Murder-Malice.-The provisions of Pen. Code, § 188,
create a presumption of malice when the commission of a
homicide by defendant has been proved and place the burden
on him to raise a reasonable doubt that malice was present.
[12] Id.-Instructions-Malice.-The term "malice aforethought"
imports something more than the definition of malice in Pen.
Code, § 7, and this definition should not be read to a jury in a
murder ease.
[13] Id. - Murder - Malice: Manslaughter - Malice.-The words
"malice aforethought," ordinarily used in distinguishing murder from manslaughter, do not imply deliberation or the lapse
of considerable time between the malicious intent to .take life
and its execution, but rather denote purpose and design in
contradistinction to accident and mischance; but this definition or test is not complete. Voluntary and some kinds of
involuntary manslaughter may be committed with purpose and
design, yet the law removes malice aforethought from all
forms of ' manslaughter.
[14] Id.-Murder-Malice.-Malicious intent is not synonymous
with wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent.
[15] Id.-Murder-Malice.-The mental state constituting malice
aforethought does not presuppose or require any ill-will or
hatred of a particular victim.
.
[16] Id. - M.urder - Malice.-When defendant, with wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result in death, he acts with
malice aforethought.
[17] Id.-Murder-First Degree Murder-Deliberation and Premeditation.-The mental state of one acting with malice aforethought must be distinguished from that state of mind described as wilful, deliberate, and premeditated, which encompas!.'es the mental state of one carefully weighing the course
of action he is about to take and choosing to kill his victim
.after considering reasons for and against it.
[18] Id.-Murder-Malice.-Where, despite awareness of the duty
society places on all persons to act within the law, defendant
does an act likely to cause serious injury or death to another,
he exhibits that wanton disregard for human life or antisocial
motivation that constitutcs malice aforethought.
[19] Id.-Murder-Malice.-An intentional act highly dangerous
to human life, done in disregard of the actor's awareness that
society requires his conduct to conform to th~ law, is done
with malice though he acts without ill will toward his victim
or believes his conduct justified, and it is immaterial that he
does not know his specific conduct is unlawful, for all persons
are presumed to know the I, IV including that prohibiting the
causing of another's injury tJ, ueath.

I
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[20] Id.-Murder-Malice.-An awareness of the obligation to act
within the general body of laws regulating society is included
in the statutory definition of implied malice in terms of an
abandoned and malignant heart· and in the definition of express malice as the deliberate' intention unlawfully to take life.
[21] Id.-Mental State.-Where, because of mental defect, disease,
or intoxication, defendant is unable to comprehend his duty
to govern his actions in accord with the duty imposed by law
he does not act with malice aforethought and cannot be guilty
of first degree murder.
[22] Criminal Law-Mental Condition-Unconsciousness: Intoxication: Homicide-Mental State.-Though unconsciousness is
ordinarily a complete defense to a criminal charge (Pen. Code,
§ 26, subd. Five), unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication cannot excuse homicide.
[2S] Id.-Mental Condition-Unconsciousness: Intoxication.-Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication is governed by
Pen. Code, § 22, rather than § 26, and is not a defense when
a crime requires only a general criminal intent.
[24] Homicide-Manslaughter-Intent.-The union or joint operation of act and intent or criminal negligence must exist in
every crime, including manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 20), and is
deemed to exist irrespective of unconsciousness arising from
voluntary intoxication.
[25] Criminal Law-Instruetions-Intoxication.-An instruction
that does not distinguish unconsciousness caused by voluntary
intoxication from that induced by other causes is erroneous.
[26] Id.-Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Sobriety.-Though expert testimony regarding defendant's inability to achieve a
specific state of mind may be necessary when the defense of
diminished mental capacity is based on mental disease or
defect, expert testimony is not essential to a jury's determination that defendant had diminished capacity to achieve the
specific state of mind because of intoxication.
[27] leL - Evidence - Opinion Evidence - Sobriety.-Nonexpert
witnesses may offer opinion testimony based on their observations of a person's intoxication, and the jury may infer the
presence and extent of defendant's intoxication from evidence
of his behavior and the amount of his drinking.
[28] Homicide - Evidence - Photographs. - In a prosecution for
homicides where the photographs of the victims were not inflammatory and were relevant to show the physical surroundings of the crime and the means by which wounds were inflicted, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that their probative value outweighed any possible prejudicial effeet.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Mendocino County. Robert L. Winslow, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of first
degree murder fixing penalty at life imprisonment reversed.
Robert Y. Bell for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. 0 'Brien and Robert
R. Granucci, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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John W. Poulos as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and
Respondent.
TRAYNOR,·C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty on two
counts of first degree murder, finding him sane at the time of
the commission of the crimes, and fixing the penalty on each
count at life imprisonment. He contends that the court erred
in instructing the jury on the elements of murder, in refusing
to give req~ested instructions on manslaughter, and in admitting into evidence photographs of the victims.
Defendant shot and killed Clifton and Elaine McCool on
Sunday, July 19, 1964, in Ukiah. The victims, who were married and the parents of three children, had recently reconciled
after a period of separation and were preparing to move to
the State of Washington. They occupied cabin No.7 of a
bungalow court near the home of defendant's sister, Goldie
Haley, with whom defendant was living at the time of the
killings. While the M:cCools were separated, Elaine became
romantically involved with defendant and told him that she
would get a divorce and marry him.
Defendant injured his back in an industrial accident several
months before the killings and had no regular employment
since that accident. On July 15, the Wednesday before the
shooting, he received two compensation checks and, as was his
habit when he had funds, began a prolonged period of steady
drinking. He and several other witnesses testified that he
drank whiskey, vodka, and finally wine continually for over
three days before the homicides. Defendant also testified that
he had been ta~ing medication to relieve the pain of his back
injury and an ulcer. A medical expert testified that some of
the medication prescribed for defendant could have increased
the effect of alcohol.
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On Thursday, July 16, the defendant took Elaine and the
McCool children on an outing and apparently engaged in
intimate relations with Elaine. When he brought her and the
children back to their cabin, she. told him that she had decided
to return to her husband.
On Sunday, July 19, defendant purchased a .30-.30 rifle
and early that evening tried it out with two friends at a
nearby dump. His friends testified that on their way back
defendant said that he ought to kill the McCools, but they
dismissed the remark as "just the booze talking" and changed
the subject. Thereafter, defendant went to his sister's home
and drank wine until about 9 p.m. He then went' to cabin
No.3 of the bungalow court and told other friends who lived
there that he was going to kill the McCools because, "I have
been hurt by three different women before. I can't take any
more. She promised to marry me." They attempted to dissuade him; but he said he had made up his mind. Once again,
however, he was not taken seriously and his friends allowed
him to leave with his rifle.
A few minutes later, four shots rang out. Upon hearing the
first shots, the occupants of cabin No.1 went to their front
porch and saw defendant shoot Elaine as she was running
from him. Defendant walked back to cabin No.3, told his
friends that he had killed the McCools, and then went to his
sister's house and told her what he had done. He left and was
found two hours later in a nearby field.
Defendant testified that he did not intend to kill the
McCools and remembered nothing from the time he was
drinking at his sister's house until his arrest. The results
of a blood alcohol test given about three hours after the shooting showed that his blood then contained .21 percent alcohol.
A medical expert testified that this alcohol level would be
sufficient to impair fine muscular coordination and judgment
in the average individual and that if defendant had consumed
no food or alcohol between 9 p.m. and midnight, the blood
alcohol level at 9 p.m. could have been .27 percent, but that
it might have been even less than .21 percent.
A defense psychologist testified that in his opinion defendant was in a dissociative state at the time of the killings and
because of personality fragmentation did not function with
his normal personality.
[1] Both sides requested manslaughter instructions. The
court ruled that even if initially there had been adequate provocation to reduce the killing from murder to manslaughter,
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a sufficient cooling period llad elapsed as a matter of law to
preclude consideration of the crime as having been committed
in the heat of passion. The court suggested that if either party
could present an evidentiary theory upon which a manslaughter instruetion could be based it would be given but
ultimately refused any such instruction, although diminished
capacity and intoxication were both suggested as theories upon
which instructions on manslaughter were required. This refusal was prejudicial error.
[2] It has long been settled that evidence of diminished
mental capacity, whether caused by intoxication, trauma, or
disease, can be used to show that a defendant did not have a
specific mental state essential to an offense. Seventeen years
ago, in People v. Wells, 33 Ca1.2d 330 [202 P.2d 53], we held
that evidence must be admitted that shows that at the time a
defendant committed an overt act he did or. did not have a
specific mental state such as malice af,?rethought. By way of
examples of the classes of crimes that require proof of a
specific mental state we mentioned "the homicides, wherein,
if a charge of murder in either degree is to be supported, there
must be proof of malice aforethought; lacking proof of malice
aforethought the homicide can be no higher offense than
manslaughter'" (Id., at p. 346.) Section 22 of the Penal Code
provided then, as it does now, that intoxication may be shown
to negate an essential state of mind. We pointed out that in
providing for the admissibility of such evidence in certain
circumstances the statute "is but declaratory of what would
be the rule were there no statute on the subject. • . . Thus the
Legislature was at pains to insure that the [rule declaring no
act less criminal because of voluntary intoxication] should
not affect the general rule as to admissibility of evidence and
necessity for proof relative to an essential specific state of
mind." (ld. at p. 357.) We concluded, therefore, that evidence of an accused's abnormal mental condition that was
relevant to malice aforethought was admissible, for malice
aforethought was a "particular purpose, motive, or intent"
essential to the crime charged. "Here, the offer was to show
not insanity, not a lack of mental capacity to have malice
aforethought, but, rather, the fact of nervous tension and that
the particular tension was directly relevant to the issue of
'purpose, motive, or intent'; i.e., to the critical question as to
whether defendant's overt act was done with 'malice aforethought'. . . . " (Id. at pp. 356-357.)
We thus clearly recognized tllat maliee aforetllOught is a
specific mental state and that a defendant IDay show that he

,,I
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lacked that mental state when it is an essential element of the
offense of which he stands accused. Since Wells had not committed a homicide, however, it remained for later cases to
demonstrate the applicability of the general rule to the manslaughter-murder distinction. . It is now urged by amicus
curiae that evidence of diminished capa.city can serve to
reduce murder from first degree to second degree, but not to
reduce murder to manslaughter, on the ground that the latter
class of offenses is restricted to homicides having the specific
statutory elements prescribed by Penal Code section 192.1
This misunderstanding may have arisen from the statement
in People v. Danielly, 33 Ca1.2d 362 [202 P.2d 18], decided
at the time of the Wells case, that" To reduce a homicide from
the class of murder to that of manslaughter the evidence must
be such as to reasonably lead the jury 'to .believe that the
defendant did, or to create a reasonable doubt in their minds
as to whether or not he did, commit his offense under a heat
of passion.... ' " (ld., at p. 377.) This statement, made in
reference to evidence that the court found insufficient to establish "heat of passion," has been interpreted as limiting the
rule of the Wells case to allow a showing only of impairment
of a defendant's ability to premeditate or deliberate and thus
reduce an offimse from first degree to second degree murder.
(See 22 So. Cal.L. Rev. 471, 473.) Read in its proper context
the statement implies no such limitation, as People v. Gorshen,
51 Cal.2d 716 [336 P.2d 492], demonstrates.
In the Gorshen case we considered the specific question:
can "evidence of a defendant's abnormal mental or physical
condition (whether caused by intoxication, by trauma, or by
disease, but not amounting to legal insanity or unconsciousness) . . . be considered to rebut malice aforethought and intent to kill in a case . . . where the prosecution evidence shows
infliction of a mortal wound for the purpose of killing and
the evidence does not show provocation which would meet the
law's definition of voluntary manslaughter, . . . " (ld. at
p.731.) In resolving this question in the affirmative we overruled earlier cases that held that the question whether the
1 Penal Code, section 192, provides: .. Manslaughter is the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:
"1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
"2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amount·
ing to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspec·
tion; provided that this subdivision shall not apply to acts committed
in the drivin&" of a vehicle.
"3. In the drivin&" of a vehicle- . • • ."
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defendant was guilty of murder or manslaughter is to be
decided solely on the basis of the reasonable man objective
standard of provocation and also overruled those cases that
held that voluntary intoxication could not be considered on
the question whether the defendant is guilty of murder or man·
slaughter. [3] We thus gave effect to the statutory require.
ments for the offense of manslaughter, "the unlawful killing
of a human being without malice," and recognized that since
the statute had been enacted before the concept of dimin.
ished capacity had been developed, its enumeration of non·
malicious criminal homicides did not include those in which
the lack of malice results from diminished capacity. That
enumeration could not be exclusive, for in the absence of
malice a homicide cannot be an offense higher than man·
slaughter. (Jackson. v. Superior Court, 62 Ca1.2d 521, 525
[42 CaLRptr. 838, 399 P.2d 374] ; People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d
795, 819 [40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959] ; People v. Bender,
27 Ca1.2d 164, 180 [163 P.2d 8] ; People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59,
82 [153 P.2d 21] ; People v. KeUcy, 208 Cal. 387, 393 [281 P.
609].) [4] Accordingly, a finding of provocation sufficient
to reduce murder to manslaughter is not the sole means by
which malice can be negated and voluntary manslaughter
established.: A person who intentionally kills may be incapable
of harboring malice aforethought because of a mental disease,
defect, or intoxication, and in such case his killing, unless
justified or· excused, is voluntary manslaughter. (People v.
Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 490-491 [35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d
677] ; PeopZe v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 716, 732; People v.
Bender, supra, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 180.)
In the present case the jury was instructed that "You
sllOuld find Mr. Conley guilty of first degree murder if you
nre convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any shooting of
either of the McCools was deliberate and premeditated as [the
court haR] defined those terms and that Mr. Conley was con·
scious of the shooting at the time." The jury was not ad·
"hIed that malice was also an essential element of murder.
[5] Defendant's plea of "not guilty" to the charge of first
degree murder put in issue the existence of tIle mental states
that are element., of that offense, namely, intent, deliberation,
wilfulness, premrdit.at.ion, and malice aforet.hought.2 (People
2" Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice afore·
thought." (Pen. Code, § 187.) "All murder which is perpetrated by
lI1<'nnR of poison, or lying ill wait, tort.ure, or by any other kind of
wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, . . • is murder of the first
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v. Henderson, supra, 60 Ca1.2d 482, 489; People v. Modesto,
59 Ca1.2d 722, 730 [31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33] ; People v.
Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal.2d 716, 733; People v. Wells, supra,
33 Cal.2d 330, 347.) Accordingly, the introduction of any evidence deserving of consideration that defendant lacked any
one of these mental states entitled him to an instruction as to
the effect of this lack. (People v. Modesto, supra, 59 Ca1.2d
722, 729; People v. Carmen, 36 Ca1.2d 768, 772-773 [228 P.2d
281].) [6] "[T]he defense of mental illness not amounting to legal insanity is a 'significant issue' in any case in which
it is raised by substantial evidence. Its purpose and effect are
to ameliorate the law governing criminal responsibility prescribed by the M'Naughton rule. . .. [7] Under the WellsGorshen rule of diminished responsibility even though a de·
fendant be legally sane according to the M'Naughton test,
if he was suffering from a mental illness that prevented his
acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and
deliberation, he cannot be convicted of murder of the first
degree . . . and where . . . substantial evidence sufficient to
inform the court that defendant is relying upon the defense
of diminished responsibility is received, it must on its own
motion instruct the jury as to the legal significance of such
evidence, for such an instruction is 'necessary for the jury
to be fully and fairly charged upon the relevant law.' "
(People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Ca1.2d 482, 490-491.)
[8] Hoping to gain complete exculpation, defendant based
his defense in part on a theory of unconsciousness. In support
of that defense he introduced evidence of iutoxication and
mental illness and testified that he had no recollection of the
shootings and did not intend to kill the McCools. Implicit in
such a defense is also the defense of diminished capacity.
The jury could well reject the claim of complete unconsciousness and yet believe that the evidence introduced to establish
unconsciousness was sufficient to indicate that defpndant's
mental capacity was substantially reduced. Counsel for both
sides made known to the court defendant's reliance on the
defense of diminished capacity. [9] Since the jury was not
advised that diminished capacity could negate the existence
of malice and that if malice were absent the offense could not
be murder, a material issue was withheld from its consideration. The denial of the right to have a significant issue deterdegree: • . . " (Pen. Code, § 189.) "In every crime or public offense
there mUBt exiBt a union, or joint operation of act ·and intent, . . ."
(Pen. Code, § 20.)

)
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mined by the jury is in itself a miscarriage of justice within
the meaning of article VI, section 4l;2, of the Constitution and
requires reversal (People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690, 703-704
[47 CalRptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365].)
[10] The Attorney General contends, however, that the jury
necessarily determined this issue under the instructions given
by finding defendant guilty of first rather than second degree
murder. There is no merit in this contention, for the issue of
malice aforethought was not presented to the jury. In the
Gorshen case we emphasized that malice is a necessary element
of both degrees of murder and that although a specific intent
. to kill is not a necessary element of second degree murder, it
is of both first degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.
We thus made it clear that the mental state existing when a
defendant has a specific intent to kill is not necessarily the
mental sta~ known as malice aforethought. We also pointed
out that when used in the statute defining murder that term
imports something more than malice as defined in Penal Code
section 7, subdivision 4, as "a wish to vex, annoy, or injure
another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, . . ."
(PeopZe v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal,2d 716, 730.) In returning a verdict of first degree murder, the jury found that
defendant's act was intentional, voluntary, deliberate, and
premeditated. They did not necessarily find, however, that
defendant acted with malice aforethought.
We have previously noted the difficulty of formulating a
comprehensive definition of malice aforethought that will serve
to distinguish murder and manslaughter. [11] Penal Code
section 188 provides that malice "may be express or implied.
It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow-creature. It
is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or
when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." These provisions create a presumption of malice when the commission of a homicide by
the defendant has been proved and place the burden on him
to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that
malice was present. (Jackson v. Superior Court, 62 Cal2d
521, 526 [42 CalRptr. 838, 399 P .2d 374].) The" conclusive
presumption" of a malicious and guilty intent set forth in
section 1962 of the Code of Civil Procedure offers no help to
the jury. To bring it into operation the jury must find "the
deliberate commission of an unlawful act for the purpose of
injuring another, " which involves subjective factors on which

)
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evidence of diminished capacity is also relevant. (People v.
Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal.2d 716, 731.) [12] As noted above,
the term imports something more than the definition given in
section 7 of the Penal Code when used in statutes relating
specifically to homicides. Indeed, section 7 's definition of
malice should not be read to a jury in a murder case. (People
v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 716, 731; People v. Chavez, 37
Ca1.2d 656, 666 [234 P.2d 632].)
The instructions given to the jury in the present case were
phrased in language more meaningful to the average layman
than the standard jury instructions in CALJIC. In attempting to adapt the CALJIC instructions to the facts of this case
and to simplify the language, however, the court failed to
define malice or instruct the' jury that a finding of malice was
essential to a verdict convicting the defendant of murder in
either degree. [13] "'Malice aforethought is a term ordinarily used in connection with the felonious killing which is
murder to designate it from manslaughter. The words do not
imply deliberation or the lapse of :considerable time between
the malicious intent to take life and its actual execution, but
rather denote purpose and design itt contradistinction to accident and mischance. . . .' But this is not a sufficiently complete definition or test, for (a) voluntary and some kinds of
involuntary manslaughter may in fact be committed with
purpose and design, yet the law removes malice aforethought
from all forms of manslaughter. . . . " (People v. Gorshen,
supra, 51 Cal.2d 716, 730, fn. 11.) [14] '" [M]alicious intent'is not synonymous with 'willful; deliberate, and premeditated' intent." (People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59, 70 [153
P.2d 21].)
[15] The mental state constituting malice aforethought
does not presuppose or require any ill will or hatred of the
particular victim. (People v. Bender, supra, 27 Ca1.2d 164,
180.) [16] When a defendant '" with wanton disregard
for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of
probability that it will result in death,' " he acts with malice
aforethought. (People v. Washington, 62 Ca1.2d 777, 782
[44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130] ; People v. Thomas, 41 Ca1.2d
470, 480 [261 P.2d 1] [concurring opinion].) [17] This
mental state must be distinguished from that state of mind
described as "wilful, deliberate, and premeditated," however. The latter phrase encompasses the mental state of one
who carefully weighs the course of action he is about to take
. . c.Jd-ll
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and chooses to kill his victim after considering the reasons
for and against it. (People v. Robillard, 55 CaUd 88, 95 [10
Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086].) A person
capable of achieving such a mental state is normally capable
also of comprehending the duty society places on all persons
to act withIn the law. [18] If, despite such awareness, he
does an act that is likely to cause serious injury or death to
another, he exhibits that wanton disregard for human life
or antilUlcial motivation that constitutes malice aforethought.
[19] An intentional act that is highly dangerous to human
life, done in disregard of the actor's awareness that society
requires him to conform his conduct to the law, is done with
malice regardless of the fact that the actor acts without ill
will toward his victim or believes that his conduct is justified.
In this respect it is immaterial that he does not 'know that·
his specific conduct is unlawful, for all persons are presumed
to know the law including that which prohibits causing injury or death to another. [20] An awareness of the obligation to ~ct within the general body of laws regUlating society,
however, is included in the statutory definition of implied
malice in terms of an abandoned and malignant heart and in
the definition of express malice as the deliberate intention
unlawfully to take life.
Thus, one who commits euthanasia bears no ill will toward
his victim and believes his act is morally justified, but he
nonetheless acts with malice if he is able to comprehend that
sOciety prohibits his act regardless of his personal belief.
[21] If because of mental defect, disease, or intoxication,
howcver, the defendant is unable to comprehend his duty to
govern his actions in accord with the duty imposed by law,
he does not act with malice aforethought and cannot be guilty
of murder in the first degree. The situation of an individual
who kills with intent, deliberation, and premeditation, but
without malice aforethought is illustrated by the evidence in
the Gorsken case. Had the trial court in that case believed
the defendant's testimony, it might have concluded that he
acted without malice when, after an altercation with his foreman and after consuming a large quantity of alcohol, he went
to his home, got his pistol, fired a shot in his living room,
drove back to his place of employment, and then after being
searched by two police officers (who did not find his gun)
and while still in their company shot the foreman. The psychiatric expert urged that because of personality disintegration
and paranoic schizophrenia the defendant believed the act
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necessary to prevent his own insanity and that the defendant
was incapable of having the "mental state which is required
fo!;, malice aforethought, or preIij.editation or anything which
implies intention, deliberation, or premeditation." (People
v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 716, 723.) The defendant had
testified that he had forgotten about" God's laws and human's
laws and everything else." (ld.) Confronted with this evidenee, the eourt or a jury could conclude that tIle defendant
killed intentionally, with premeditation and deliberation, but
did not do so with malice aforethougllt. Although legally sane
according to the M'Naughton test, such a defendant could not
be convicted of murder if mental illness prevented his acting
with malice aforethought. (People v. Wolff, 61 Ca1.2d 795,
819 [40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959] ; People v. Henderson,
supra, 60 Ca1.2d 482, 490.) Similarly in the present case, the
jury could have found that although defendant deliberated
and premeditated the killings, his intoxication and mental disorder precluded malice aforethought. In finding him guilty
of first degree murder under the instructions given it therefore did not neeessarily determine that he acted with malice
aforethought. .
Inasmuch as reversal is required and similar issues will
undoubtedly be raised on retrial we deem it advisable to comment on the defendant's theory that unconsciousness would
be a complete defense to the murder charge. The court instructed the jury in accord with this theory tIl at "If you are
convinced that William Conley shot either of the McCools,
you will then have to decide whether such shooting occurred
without the defendant William Conley, being conscious of the
shooting. If he shot either of said persons without being conscious of the shooting, he would not be guilty of a erime, and
your verdict as to any such shooting would be not guilty."
Defendant offered evidence of intoxication caused by alcohol and drugs to support his deff'nse of unconsciousness.
[a2] Unconsciousness is ordinarily a complete defense to a
criminal charge. (Pen. Code, § 26. suhd. Five.) If the state
of unconsciousness is causpd by voluntary intoxication, however, it is not a complpte defense. Intoxication can so diminisll
a person's mental capacity that he is unable to achieve a
specific state of mind requisite to a crime. but, ('ven if it is
sufficient to destroy volition. it <'allnot excuse homicide.
(People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550. ii7!i r268 P.2d 705].)
[a3] Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication is
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governed by Penal Code section 22,3 rather than section 26,
and it is not a defense when a crime requires only a general
criminal intent. (People v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 716,
727; People v. Baker, supra, 42 Ca1.2d 550, 575; People v.
Sanchez, 35 Ca1.2d 522, 531 [219 P.2d 9].) [24] The union
or joillt operation of act and intent or criminal negligence
must exist in every crime, including manslaughter (Pen. Code,
§ 20), and is deemed to exist irrespective of unconsciousness
arising from voluntary intoxication. [25] An instruction
that does not distinguish unconsciousness caused by voluntary
intoxication from that induced by other causes is erroneous. 4
It is urged that no instruction on manslaughter need be
given when a defense of unconsciousness caused by voluntary
intoxication is presented unless the defense is supported by ex3Pcnal Code section 22 provides: "No act committed by a person
while in a state of voluntary intoxication iH less criminal by reason of
his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence
of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to
constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take
into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time,
in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed
the act."
41n adapting its instructions to a case such as this in which diminished
capacity 'and unconsciousness because of voluntary intoxication are
relied on by the defense, the felony murder doctrine is not involved, and
there is no evidence of poisoning, torture, or lying in wait, the eourt
might advise the jury:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
Sucb malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is
manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a
fellow ereature. It is implied when no eonsiderable provocation appears,
or when tbe circumstances attending the killing sbow an abandoned and
malignant heart.
The law prohibits acts highly dangerous to human life that eause
serious injury or death, unless legal eause or excuse is shown. Malice
aforethought, eithcr express or implied. is manifested by the doing of
slIch an act by a person who is able to comprehend this prohibition and
his ohligation to conform his coniluct to it. There is a presumption that
the defendant was able to understand this prohibition but he may
rclmt the presumption by evidence of diminished capacity on which I
I<hall instruct you shortly. Malice dOL'S 1Iot require a pre-existing hatred
or enmity toward the person injured.
All murder perpetrat('d hy any kind of wilful, deliberate, and prem('ditated killing is murder of the first degree. (To be followed here by
fletillitions of deliberation and premeditation as in customary instructions.)
Murder of the sccond degree must be distinguished not only from
Illurder of the first degree, but also from manslaughter. Manslaugbter
HhortIy will be defined for you, and you will notc tbat an essential feature
of that offense, whit'h distinguishes it from murder, is thnt the killing
bc ,lone without malice,
If the unlawful Idlling of a hUlllan bt,ing is done with malicc aforethought, hut without nplih(",,,tion nllrl premcditation, Hlllt i8,· without
the wilful, deliberate and Pfl'lllCditlited intent to take life that is an
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pert testimony regarding diminished capacity. [26] Although
expert testimony with regard to a defendant's inability to
achieve a specific state of mind may be necessary when the
defense of diminished capacity. is based upon mental disease
or defect, such testimony is not essential to a determination
by a jury that a defendant has diminished capacity to achieve
a specific state of mind because of intoxication. [27] Nonexpert witnesses may offer opinion testimony based on their
observations as to a person's intoxication (People v. Monteith,
73 Cal. 7, 9 [14 P. 373]) and the jury may infer the presence
and extent of a defendant's intoxication from evidence of his
behavior and the amount of his drinking. (Cf. People v.
Rittger, 54 Cal.2d 720, 730 [7 Cal.Rptr. 901, 355 P .2d 645].)
essential element of first degree murder, then the offense is murder in
the second degree.
The defendant has offered evidence that because of mental illness
and intoxication he was unconscious. If you find that he was conscious
of the shootings, but had substantially reduced mental capacity because
of mental illness or intoxication, you must consider what effect, if any,
this diminished capacity had on the defendant '8 ability to form any of
the specific mental states that are essential elements of murder, which I
have defined for you, or of manslaughter, which I will define shortly.
Thus, if you find that the defendant killed Mr. or Mrs. McCool while
eonscious and with malice, you will return a verdict of murder. If you
find that this murder was committed wilfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation, you will find the murder to be of the first degree. If you
find, however, that the defendant's mental capacity was so diminished
that he did not, or you have a reasonable doubt whether he did, premeditate, deliberate, or form an intent to kill, you will find the murder
to be of the second degree.
Premeditation, deliberation, an intent to kill, and malice must be
present for the killing to be first degree murder.
Malice is an essential element of either degree of murder. Therefore,
if you find that the defendant did not harbor malice because of his
diminished capacity, or have a reasonable doubt whether he harbored
malice, you cannot find him guilty of a higher offense than manslaughter.
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.
Two kinds of manslaughter, the definit.ions of which are pertinent here,
are:
1. Voluntary manslaughter, an intentional killing in which the law,
recognizing human frailty, permits the defendant to establish the lack
of malice either by
a. Showing provocation such as to rouse the reasonable man to heat
. of passion or Budden quarrel. When such provocation is shown, the law
will presume that the defendant who acts in the heat of passion or on
sudden quarrel, acts without malice. I instruct you that as a matter of
law no such provocation was shown to exist at the time of the killing of
Mr. and Mrs. McCool. Or by
b. Showing that due to diminished capacity caused by mental illness,
mental defect, or intoxication, the defendant did not attain the mental
IItate constituting malice.
2. Involuntary manslanghter is a killing in the commission of an unlawfulaet not amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a lawful
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[28] Defendant contends also that the trial court erred in
admitting photographs of the bodies of Clifton and Elaine
McCool on the ground that the prejudicial effect of the photographs outweighed any probative value they might have. The
photographs 3;re not inflammatory and are relevant to show
the physical surroundings of the crime and the means by
which the wounds were inflicted. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that their probative value outweighed any possible prejudicial effect. (People v. Harrison,
59 Ca1.2d 622, 627 [30 Cal.Rptr. 841, 381 P .2d 665] .)
The judgment is reversed.
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Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J., concurred.
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MOSK, J.-I concur under compulsion of the first Modesto
decision. (People v. Modesto (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 722, 730 [31
C81.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33].)
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. In my opinion there was no prejudicial error. Therefore, pursuant to the mandate of article
VI, section 4 1,6, of the Constitution of the State of California,
the alleged error should be disregarded and the judgment
affirmed"
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied April 27,
1966, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.
McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due
caution and circumspection.
Thus, if you find that the defendant killed while unconscious as a
result of voluntary intoxication and was therefore unable to formulate
a specific intent to kill or to harbor malice, his killing is involuntary
manslaughter. The law does not permit him to use his own vice as a
shelter against the normal legal consequences of his aet. An ordinary
and prudent man would not, while in possession of a dangerous weapon,
permit himself to reach such a state of intoxication as to be unconscious
of his actions.

